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Abstract
Strategic decision making involves affective and cognitive functions like
reasoning, cognitive and emotional empathy which may be subject to age
and gender differences. However, empathy-related changes in strategic
decision-making and their relation to age, gender and neuropsychological
functions have not been studied widely. In this article, we study a one-
shot prisoner dilemma from a psychological game theory viewpoint. Forty
seven participants (28 women and 19 men), aged 18 to 42 years, were
tested with a empathy questionnaire and a one-shot prisoner dilemma
questionnaire comprising a closiness option with the other participant.
The percentage of cooperation and defection decisions was analyzed. A
new empathetic payoff model was calculated to fit the observations from
the test whether multi-dimensional empathy levels matter in the outcome.
A significant level of cooperation is observed in the experimental one-
shot game. The collected data suggests that perspective taking, empathic
concern and fantasy scale are strongly correlated and have an important
effect on cooperative decisions. However, their effect in the payoff is not
additive. Mixed scales as well as other non-classified subscales (25+8 out
of 47) were observed from the data.
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1 Introduction
In recent years a growing field of behavioral game studies has started to emerge
from several academic perspective. Some of these approaches and disciplines
such as neuroscience, social psychology, artificial intelligence have already pro-
duced major collections and experiments on empathy. In the context of strategic
interaction, empathy may play a key role in the decision-making and the out-
come of the game.
Widely known results in repeated games
For long-run interactions under suitable monitoring assumption it has been
shown that cooperative outcomes may emerge as time goes. This is known as
“Folk Theorem” or general feasibility theorem (see [1, 2]). For example, the
Tit-For-Tat Strategy which consists to start the game by cooperating,Then do
whatever your other participant did on the previous iteration, leads to a partial
cooperation between the players . While cooperation may emerge by means of
repeated long-run interactions under observable plays, there is very little study
on how cooperation can be possible in one-shot games.
How about cooperative behavior in one-shot games?
Unfortunately, the Folk theorem result does not apply to one-shot games. This
is because there is no previous iteration. There is no next iteration in one-shot
games. There is no opportunity to detect, learn or punish from experiences. For
the same reasons, the existing reputation-based schemes do not apply directly.
Is cooperation possible outcome in experimental one-shot
games?
Experimental results have revealed a strong mismatch between the outcome of
the experiments and the predicted outcome from classical game model. Is the
observed mismatch because of some important factors that are not considered
in the classical game formulation? Is it because the empathy of the players are
neglected in the classical formulation?
This work conducts a basic experiment on one-shot prisoner dilemma and
establishes correlation between players choices and their empathy levels. The
prisoner’s dilemma is a canonical example of a game analyzed in classical game
theory that shows why two individuals (without empathy consideration) might
not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best interests to do so in terms
of collective decision. It was originally framed by Flood and Dresher working at
RAND. In 1950, Tucker gave the name and interpretation of prisoner’s dilemma
to Flood and Dresher’s model of cooperation and conflict, resulting in the most
well-known game theoretic academic example.
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Contribution
The contribution of this work can be summarized as follows. We investigate how
players behave and react in experimental one-shot Prisoner Dilemma in relation
to their levels of empathy. The experiment is conducted with several voluntary
participants from different countries, cultures and educational backgrounds. For
each participant to the project the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) which
is a multi-dimensional empathy measure, is used. In contrast to the classical
empathy scale studied in game theory literature that are limited to perspective
taking, this work goes one-step further by investigating the effect of three other
empathy subscales: empathy concern, fantasy scale and personal distress. The
experiment reveals a strong mixture of the empathy scales across the popu-
lation. In addition, each participant responds to a questionnaire that mimics
one-shot Prisoner Dilemma situation and specific reaction time and closiness
to the other participant. We observe that empathic concern as well as fantasy
scale dimensions may affect positively other-regarding payoff. In contrast to the
classical prisoner dilemma in which Defection is known as a dominating strat-
egy, the experimental game exhibits a significant level of cooperation in the
population (see Section 4). In particular, Defection not a dominating strategy
anymore when players’ psychology is involved. Based on these observations an
empathetic payoff model in Section 4, that better captures the preferences of
the decision-makers, is proposed. With this empathetic payoff, the outcome of
the game captures more the observed cooperation level in the one-shot prisoner
dilemma. The experiment reveals not only positive affect of empathy but also a
dispositional negative affect (spiteful or malicious) of empathy in the decision-
making of some of the participants. Spitefulness is observed at the personal
distress scale in the population. Person distress scale is negatively correlated
with perspective taking scale. Taken together, these findings suggest that the
empathy types of the participants play a key role in their payoffs and in their
decision in one-shot prisoner dilemma. It also reduces the gap between game
theory and game practice by closing-the-loop between model and observations.
It provides an experimental evidence that strengthens the model of empathetic
payoff and its possible engineering applications [45].
Stucture
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section presents some
background and literature overview on empathy. Section 3 presents the exper-
imental study about the impact of individual psychology on human decision
making in one-shot prisoner dilemma. The analysis of the results of the ex-
periment are presented in Section 4. An explanation of the results is given in
Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2 Background on Empathy
From the field of relational care to the field of economy, the concept of empathy
seems to have an ubiquitously position. Empathy is not only an important and
longstanding issue, but a commonly used term in everyday life and situations.
Even if it is easily approached and used, this concept has until nowadays different
definitions and meanings. Born in the aesthetic and philosophical field, it came
to be an important operative concept in behavioral game theory, where once
more it is used as an instrument to create relations between decision-makers.
The public opinion and the world scientific scenario, however, are not always
giving the correct attention to what is implying an empathetic reaction with
the others: be empathetic is not something simple as well as is not something
given once to the personality of persons. It depends on the context of relations
and on the social interaction dimension where people are involved as players,
consumers, or agents.
Definition of Empathy
We present historical definitions and concepts of empathy. Rather than having
to choose which of the ’definitions’ of empathy is correct, this work suggests
a better appreciation for it as a multidimensional phenomenon at least allows
a perspective and the ability to specify which aspect of empathy the experi-
mentalist and the theorist are referring to when making particular particular
investigation in behavioral games.
• Philosophy: From philosophical perspective, Empathy derives from the
Greek word ǫ´µπα´θǫiα (empatheia), which literally means physical affec-
tion. In particular, it is composed by ǫ´v (en) “in, at” and πα´θoς (pathos),
“passion” or “suffering”. The work in [3] has introduced the term Ein-
fuhlung to aesthetic philosophical field in his main book “On the optical
Sense of Form: A contribution to Aesthetics” and many other authors (see
[4] and the references therein), have introduced the concept to feeling and
quasi-perceptual acts.
• Psychology: From a psychological perspective, it corresponds to a cogni-
tive awareness of the emotions, feelings and thoughts of the other persons.
In this sense, the term primary significance is that of “an intellectual
grasping of the affects of another, with the result of a mimic expression of
the same feelings” [5].
• Sociology: From a sociological perspective, empathy corresponds to an
ability to be aware of the internal lives of the others. It is related to
the existence of language as a sort of personal awareness of us as selves
[6]. Regarding a neuroscientific perspective, empathy has been studied
as a “two empathic sub-processes, explicitly considering those states and
sharing other’s internal states” [7]. These two cognitive processes are
exhaustively represented in the Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Cognitive and emotional empathy are the bases of Empathy. They
are related to cognitive and affective Theory of Mind as suggested in [21].
Empathy lies in the structures that include the anterior insula cortex and
the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex. In particular, empathy for others pain
is considered being located in anterior insula cortex [8, 10]. These areas are
studied in relation to empathy and empathy concerns of collective actions
(CA) [9]. Oxytocin (OT), an “evolutionarily ancient molecule that is a
key part of the mammalian attachment system”, is considered in these
studies as a sort of variable to be manipulated to increase or decrease CA
in human beings.
Furthermore, empathy must be analyzed in relation to the concepts of com-
passion and sympathy. Compassion, from Latin ecclesiastical compati (suffer
with), literally means have feelings together. Nowadays it is associated with the
capacity of feeling the other’s worries, even tough it doesn’t imply an automatic
action. Sympathy, from the Greek σuµπa´θǫia, literally means fellow feelings.
Its meaning lies in the capacity of understanding the internal feelings of the
other with the intentional desire of changing his/her worries. As per indication
in [11], “the object of sympathy is the other person’s well being. The object of
empathy is understanding”. It has been difficult to distinguish empathy from
sympathy because they both involve the emotional state of one person to the
state of another. This problem was increased by the fact that the mapping of
the terms has recently reversed: what is now commonly called empathy was
referred to before the middle of the twentieth century as sympathy [12]. At the
end, the concept of empathy must be understood also in relation to Theory of
Mind. Theory of Mind, also described as ToM, is the capability to understand
of others as mental beings, with personal mental states, for example feelings,
motives and thoughts. It is one of the most important developments in early
childhood social cognition and it is influencing children life at home as well as at
school. Its development from birth to 5 years of age is now described in research
literature with the possibility to understand how infants and children behave in
experimental and natural situations [13].
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Different types of empathy
We are not restricting ourselves to the positive part of empathy. Empathy may
have a dark or at least costly side specially when the environment is strategic
and interactive as it is the case in games. Can empathy be bad for the self?
Empathy can be used, for example, by a other player attacker to identify the
weak nodes in the network. Can empathy be bad for others? Empathetic users
may use their ability to destroy the opponents. In strategic interaction between
people, empathy may be used to derive antipathetic response (distress at seeing
others’ pleasure, or pleasure at seeing others distress). In both cases, it will
influence the dynamics of the self and other regarding preferences.
The ability of empathy to generate moral behavior and determine cooper-
ation is limited by three common occurrences: over-arousal, habituation and
bias.
• Empathic over-arousal is an involuntary process that occurs when an ob-
server’s empathic distress becomes so painful and intolerable that it is
transformed into an in tense feeling of personal distress, which may move
the person out of the empathic mode entirely [14, 15] .
• Generally speaking, in a classical relation victim-observer, the greater is
the victim’s distress, the greater is the observer’s empathic distress. If a
person is exposed repeatedly to distress over time, the person’s empathic
distress may diminish to the point where the person becomes indifferent
to the distress of others. This is called habituation. This diminished
empathic distress and corresponding indifference is very common in those
who, for example, abuse and kill animals.
• Humans evolved in small groups. These groups sometimes competed for
scarce resources: in this way is not surprising that evolutionary psycholo-
gists have identified kin selection has a moral motivator with evolutionary
roots. The forms of familiarity bias include in-group bias and similarity
biases. In-group bias is simply the tendency to favour one’s own group.
This is not one group in particular, but whatever group we are able to as-
sociate with at a particular time. In-group bias is working on self-esteem
of the members. On the opposite side of these biases, we have out-group
ones, where people out of the groups are considered in a negative way,
with a different (and, for the most of the time) and worst treatment (e. g,
racial inequality). The similarity bias derives from psychological heuris-
tic pertaining to how people make judgments based on similarity. More
specifically, similarity biases are used to account for how people make
judgments based on the similarity between current situations and other
situations or prototypes of those situations. The goal of these biases is to
maximize productivity through favorable experience while not repeating
unfavourable experiences (adaptive behaviour).
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Empathy main integrative theories
During the 1970s, in the public psychological scenario empathy was conceived
as a procedure with affective and cognitive implications. The work in [16] intro-
duced the first multidimensional model of empathy in the psychological litera-
ture, where affective and cognitive procedures were working together. According
to her, although empathy is defined as a shared emotion between two persons,
it depends on cognitive factors. In her integrative-affective model, the affective
empathy reaction derives from three components factors, hereinafter described.
The first is represented by the cognitive ability to discriminate affective cues in
others, the second by the cognitive skills that are involved in assuming the per-
spective and role of the others and the third factor is, at the end, described by
the emotional responsiveness, the affective ability to experience emotions. By
the other hand, one of the most comprehensive perspectives on empathy and its
relation to the moral development is provided in [17]. The author considered
empathy as a biologically based disposition for altruistic behavior [17]. He con-
ceives of empathy as being due to various modes of arousal, which allows us to
respond empathically in light of a variety of distress cues from another person.
The author mentions mimicry, classical conditioning, and direct association as
fast acting and automatic mechanisms producing an empathic response. The
author lists mediated association and role taking in relation to more cognitively
demanding modes, mediates by language and proposed some of the limitations
in our natural capacity to empathize or sympathize with others, particularly
what he refers to as ’here and now’ biases. In other words, the main tendency
according to [17], is to empathize more with persons that are in some sense
perceived to be closer to us. The authors in [18] defined empathy as a shared
emotional experience occurring when one person (comes to feel a similar emotion
to another (the object) as a result of perceiving the other’s state. This process
results from the representations of the emotions activated when the subject pays
attention to the emotional state of the object. The neural mechanism assumes
that brain areas have processing domains based on their cellular composition
and connectivity.
The main theories that we will discuss further are related to the use we
will have of empathy concept in game theory analysis. Broadly speaking, we
are approaching empathy as made up of two components, an affective and a
cognitive one. The affective (or emotional) component develops from infants and
its structure may be summarized in this progressive intertwinement, a.) emotion
recognition, b.) empathic concern, c.) personal distress and d.) emotional
contagion. The cognitive component of empathy develops during the progressive
development of the person from his her childhood. It is based on the theory of
mind, imagination (of emotional future outcomes) and on perspective taking.
According to [19] two main approaches have been used to study empathy:
the first one focuses on cognitive empathy or the ability to take the perspective
of another person and to infer his mental state (Theory of Mind). The second
one emphasizes emotional or affective empathy [20] defined as an observer’s
emotional response to another person’s emotional state. The Table 1 below
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Emotional Empathy Cognitive Empathy
Simulation System Mentalizing system
Theory of Mind
Emotional contagion, personal distress perspective taking
Empathic concern, emotion recognition imagination of emotional future outcomes
Core structure Core structure
Development Development
Table 1: Principal features of affective and cognitive empathy.
highlights some of principal features of affective and cognitive empathy [21].
A model of empathy-altruism was developed in [22]. Through the lines of
this model, the author simply assumes that empathy feelings for another person
create an altruistic motivation to increase that person’s welfare. In particular,
the work in [23] found out how the participants in a social dilemma experiment
allocated some of their resource to a person for whom they felt empathy. The
author developed also the model of empathy-joy [22]. This hypothesis underlines
how a prosocial act is not completely explained only by empathy but, also, by
the positive emotion of joy a helper expects as a result of helping another person
in need. In connection with this theory, empathy relies on an automatic process
that generates, immediately, other types of behavior useful to predict the other-
regarding actions. In relation to one-trial prisoner’s dilemma [24] underlined
how empathy-altruism should increase cooperation (that, then, will emerge in
the situation).
The model of empathic brain proposed in [25] proposes a modulate model
of empathy, where different factors occur in its development. These factors are
four, in particular related to four different situations so described, i) one is in
affective state, ii) this state is isomorphic to another person’s affective state,
iii) this state is elicited by the observation or imagination of another person’s
affective state, iv) one knows that the other person is the source of one’s own
affective state. Condition (a) is particularly important as it helps to differen-
tiate empathy from mentalizing. Mentalizing is the ability to represent others’
mental states without emotional involvement. In particular, the two authors
are underlying the epistemological value of empathy, by one side related to pro-
vide information about future actions between people and, by the other side, to
function as “origin of the motivation for cooperative and prosocial behavior”.
The model we provide is based on both these theories and, in particular, it
will take into account the distinction between empathy itself and the cortical
representations of the emotions. By a developmental point of view, empathy is
studied also in relation with prosocial behavior. Two theoretical studies [26, 27]
are fundamental in this sense. In particular, the author considers that the de-
velopment of a vicarious affective reaction to another distress is beginning from
infancy. Individual patterns of behavior that responses to the distress are, also,
tailored to the needs of the other. According to [28] although an empathic basis
to altruistic behavior entails a net cost to the actor, cooperation and altruism
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require behavior tailored to the feelings and needs of others.
How to measure empathy?
We overview empathy measurement in psychology and present existing models
of empathy’s effect in game theory.
Empathy measures in Psychology
Psychologists used to study both situational and dispositional empathy con-
cepts. Situational empathy, i.e., empathic reactions in a specific situations,
is measured by asking subjects about their experiences immediately after they
were exposed to a particular situation, by studying the “facial, gestural, and vo-
cal indices of empathy-related responding” [46] or by various physiological mea-
sures such as the measurement of heart rate or skin conductance. Dispositional
empathy, understood as a person’s stable character trait, has been measured
either by relying on the reports of others (particularly in case of children) or,
most often (in researching empathy in adults), by relying on the administration
of various questionnaires associated with specific empathy scales.
• Measuring empathic ability: The work in [47] proposes to test empathic
ability by measuring the degree of correspondence between a person A and
a person B’s ratings of each other on six personality traits-such as self-
confidence, superior-inferior, selfish-unselfish, friendly-unfriendly, leader-
follower, and sense of humor-after a short time of interacting with each
other. More specifically, empathic ability is measured through a question-
naire that asked both persons, i) to rate themselves on those personality
traits, ii) to rate the other as they see them, iii) to estimate from their
perspective of how the other would rate himself and to rate themselves
according to how they think the other would rate them. Person’s A em-
pathic ability is then determined by the degree to which A’s answers to
(iii) and (iv) corresponds to B’s answer to (i) and (ii). The less A’s an-
swers diverge from B’s, the higher one judges A’s empathic ability and
accuracy. The test aims to measure the level of empathy thanks to the
dimension of role-taking.
• Empathy Test: The authors in [48] created the so-called Empathy Test,
that was used in industry in the 1950s. The main purpose of the test is to
measure person’s ability to ”anticipate” certain typical reactions, feelings
and behaviour of other people. This test consists of three sections, which
require persons to rank the popularity of 15 types of music, the national
circulation of 15 magazines and the prevalence of 10 types of annoyance
for a particular group of people.
• Measure of cognitive empathy: The authors in [49] is a cognitive empathy
scale that consists of 64 questions selected from a variety of psycholog-
ical personality tests such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality In-
ventory (MMPI) and the California Personality Inventory (CPI). Hogan
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chose those questions in response to which he found two groups of people-
who were independently identified as either low-empathy or high-empathy
individuals-as showing significant differences in their answers.
• Measure of emotional empathy: EETS, Emotional Empathy Tendency
Scale, has been developed in [50]. The questionnaire consists of 33 items
divided into seven subcategories testing for “susceptibility to emotional
contagion”, ”appreciation of the feelings of unfamiliar and distant oth-
ers,“extreme emotional responsiveness”, “tendency to be moved by others’
positive emotional experiences”, “tendency to be moved by others’ nega-
tive emotional experience”, “sympathetic tendency”, and “willingness to
be in contact with others who have problems”. This questionnaire empha-
sizes the original definition of the empathy construct in its seven subscales
that together show high split-half reliability, indicating the presence of a
single underlying factor thought to reflect affective or emotional empa-
thy. The authors in [51] suggested more recently, however, that rather
than measuring empathy per se, the scale more accurately reflects general
emotional arousability. In response, a revised version of the measure, the
Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale [52] intercepts respondent’s reactions
to others’ mental states [55].
• Multidimensional measure of empathy: The Interpersonal Reactivity In-
dex has been developed in [56] as an instrument whose aim was to measure
individual differences in empathy. The test is made of 28 items belonging
to cognitive and emotional domain, and, in particular, they are belong-
ing to four different domains. These are represented by four different
subscales, Perspective Taking, Empathic Concern, Fantasy and Personal
Distress, each of which includes seven item answered on a 5-point scale
ranging from 0 (Does not describes me very well) to 4 (Describes me very
well). The Perspective Taking subscale measures the capability to adopt
the views of the others spontaneously. The Empathic Concern subscale
measures a tendency to experience the feelings of others and to feel sym-
pathy and compassion for the unfortunate people.
• Self-report empathy measure: Regarding the dimension of self-report em-
pathy measures, we consider important to be mentioned the Scale of
Ethnocultural Empathy [57], the Jefferson Scale of Physician Empathy
[58], the Nursing Empathy Scale [59], the Autism Quotient [60] and the
Japanese Adolescent Empathy Scale [61]. Although these instruments
were designed for use with specific groups, aspects of these scales may be
suitable for assessing a general capacity for empathic responding.
• Measuring deficit in theory of mind: The Autism Quotient [60] was de-
veloped to measure Autism spectrum disorder symptoms. The authors
viewed a deficit in theory of mind as the characteristic symptom of this
disease [62] and a number of items from this measure relate to broad
deficits in social processing (e.g., “I find it difficult to work out people’s
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intentions.”). Thus, any measure of empathy should exhibit a negative
correlation with this measure. The magnitude of this relation, however,
will necessarily be attenuated by the other aspects of the Autism Quo-
tient, which measure unrelated constructs (e.g., attentional focus and local
processing biases). Additional self-report measures of social interchange
appearing in the neuropsychological literature contain items tapping em-
pathic responding including the Disexecutive Questionnaire [63] and a
measure of emotion comprehension developed in [64]. These scales focus
on the respondent’s ability to identify the emotional states expressed by
another (e.g., “I recognize when others are feeling sad”.). Current theo-
retical notions of empathy emphasize the requirement for understanding
of another’s emotions to form an empathic response [65]. Only a small
number of items on current measures of empathy, however, assess this abil-
ity. Table 2 summarizes the Empathy scales measurement in Psychology
overviewed above.
Empathy Models in Game Theory
In this subsection, we review some fundamental aspect of behavioral game the-
ory. By a game theoretic approach, empathy and emotive intelligence are con-
sidered essential for the development of the games themselves between players.
In particular, empathy is essential for the strategic evolution of the games and
foundational of Nash Equilibrium [29, 30]. In other words, empathy itself is the
instrument that let the dynamic process between n-players happen as well as
the understanding and evaluation of their preferences and beliefs. Cooperative
behavior patterns must be considered an important sample of close relations
between individuals, based on confidding and disclosure. Relations like helping
and assistance behavior, as well as mutual confiding, mutual communication
and self disclosure are of cooperative behavior. To understand the possible role
of friendship in cooperation or defection between n-players in one-shot prisoner
dilemma, it’s essential to reflect on how the evolutionary line of our specie has
the possibility to create close relationship only between persons who are con-
sidering themselves keen in terms of genes. The same kind of attitude is also
influencing communal relationship.The cooperative behaviour in one shot Pris-
oner Dilemma between friends, in particular, lead to the activation of the so
called cooperative-parithetic system, that is activated only when there is the
perception that the last goal may be reached through a sort of collaboration
between the players of the group itself. Empathy has been approached in differ-
ent ways regarding game theory field. The author in [31] underlines how homo
economicus must be empathetic to some degree, even if in a different meaning
from the concept used in [32, 33]. In particular, in relation to game theory, he
introduces the concept of empathy in connection to the study of interpersonal
comparison of utility in games.
More specifically, the model of empathy - altruism developed in [22] whose
assumption is that empathy feelings for another person create an altruistic moti-
vation to increase that person’s welfare. Furthermore, the work of [34] is related
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ITEMS SCALE CORE CONCEPT
AUTHORS
Empathy Ability 24 0-4 Likert
Scale
Imaginative trans-
posing of oneself
into the thinking of
another
Dymond (1949)
Empathy Test 40 Ranking
Multiple
Choice
Cognitive role-
taking
Kerr & Speroff
(1954)
Empathy Scale 64 0-4 Likert
Scale
Apprehension of
another’s condition
or state of mind by
an intellectual or
imaginati ve point
of view
Hogan (1969)
EETS - Emotional
Empathy Tendency
Scale
33 -4 to 4 Likert
Scale
Emotional Empa-
thy
Mehrabian & Ep-
stein (1972)
IRI- Interpersonal
Reactivity Index
28 0-4 Likert
Scale
Reactions of one in-
dividual to the ob-
served experiences
of another
Davis (1980)
Ethnocultural Em-
pathy Scale
31 Culturally Specific
Empathy Patterns
Wang, David
son,Yakushko,
Savoy, Tan, Bleier
(2003)
Jefferson Scale of
Physician Empathy
5 0 - 5 Likert
Scale
Patient oriented vs
technology oriented
empathy in physi-
cians
Kane, Gotto, Man-
gione, West , Hojat,
(2001)
Nursing Empathy
Scale
12 0-7 Likert
Scale
Nurses empathic
behaviour in the
context of inter-
action with the
client
Reynolds (2000)
Autism Quotient 50 0-4 Likert
Scale
Autism Spectrum
Disorder symptoms
Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright,
Skinner, Martin,
Cubley (2001)
Japanese Ado-
lescent Empathy
Scale
30 Likert Scale Empathy to feel or
not to feel posi-
tive and negative
feelings towards the
others
Hashimoto, Shiomi
(2002)
Table 2: Empathy measurement in psychology
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to how the participants in a social dilemma experiment allocate some of their
resource to a person for whom they felt empathy. In the context of one trial pris-
oner’s dilemma the authors underlined how empathy altruism should increase
cooperation (that, then, will emerge in the situation). Secondly, the model of
empathy joy developed in [35]. This hypothesis underlines how a prosocial act is
not completely explained only by empathy but, also, by the positive emotion of
joy a helper expects as a result of helping (or, better, of having a beneficial im-
pact on) another person in need. In connection with this theory, empathy relies
on an automatic process that generates, immediately, other types of behaviour
useful to predict the other regarding actions [79, 80].
The works in [36, 37] proposed the exploration of more psychological and
process-oriented models as a more productive framework in comparison with
the classical ones in game theory (fairness, impure altruism, reciprocity). At
the light of this perspective, many concepts related to human behaviour are in-
troduced to explain choice in game theory approach. Empathy as an operative
concept must be understood as different from biases affecting belief formation
and biases affecting utility. Empathy is operating through both beliefs and util-
ity formation. Hence, in the presence of empathy, “beliefs and utility become
intricately linked” [38]. Regarding empathy as a process of beliefs formation,
the author proposed to analyze two mechanisms, imagine-self and imagine-other.
Imagine self-players are able to imagine themselves in other people’s shoes, in
other words they try to imagine themselves in similar circumstances. ”Imagine
other” is when a person tries to imagine how another person is feeling. The
authors underlined how empathy refers to people’s capability to infer what oth-
ers think or feel, the so-called mind reading. They underlined, at the same
time, how empathy itself may have also any consequences on each player evalu-
ation. The main contribution of the authors lies in a critique analysis of altru-
istic behaviour in game theory. With three toy games, they demonstrated how
empathy-altruism is not always linked with imagine-other dimension (and the
so-called beliefs formation), since players may use only imagine-self dimension.
The authors in [41] criticize a common concept of given empathy present
in public good experiment and, at the end, they demonstrate how empathy
may be linked more to the context and social interaction itself in game theory
experimental researches. The work [42] states that a disposition for empathy
does not influence the behaviour related to different games (towards them a
central role is played by Theory of Mind). Regarding this position, the same
authors are underlying that also individual differences related to empathy do not
shape social preferences. On the contrary, many other studies conducted show
how empathy may influence the structure of the games themselves. The work
in [43] study the Ultimatum Game in an evolutionary concept and underline,
in their study, how empathy can lead to the evolution of fairness. The work in
[44] studied the correlation between empathy, anticipated guilt and pro social
behaviour; in this study he found out that empathy affects pro-social behaviour
in a more complex way than the one represented by the model of social choices.
Recently, the concept of empathy has been introduced in mean-field-type
games in [45, 66, 67, 68] in relation to cognitively plausible explanation mod-
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els of choices in wireless medium access channel and mobile devices strategic
interaction. The main results of this applied research that lie in an operative
and real world use of empathy concept, are represented by the enforcement of
mean-field equilibrium payoff equity and fairness itself between players.
3 Study
Participants
The population of participants includes 47 persons between 18 and 42 years
old. The population is composed of 19 men and 28 women chosen from different
educational backgrounds, cultures and nationalities (see Table 3). The names of
the participants are not revealed. Different numbers are generated and assigned
to the participants.
Gender Number Frequency %
Men 19 40.42
Women 28 59.58
Total 47
Table 3: Composition: gender and frequency of the participants
All the subjects were asked to perform two different tests: an IRI test (In-
terpersonal Reactivity Index [69]) and a questionnaire that is mimicking, with
an empathic and moral emphasis, a prisoner dilemma situation.
Empathy questionnaire
The IRI is a 28-item, 5-point Likert-type scale that evaluates four dimensions of
empathy: Perspective-Taking, Fantasy, Empathic Concern, and Personal Dis-
tress. Each of these four subscales counts 7 items. The Perspective-Taking
subscale measures empathy in the form of individual’s tendency to adopt, in a
spontaneous way, the other’s points of view. The Fantasy subscale of the IRI
evaluates the subject’s ability to put themselves into the feelings and behaviours
of fictional characters in books, movies, or plays. The Empathic Concern sub-
scale assesses individual’s feelings of concern, warmth, and sympathy toward
others. The Personal Distress subscale measures self-oriented anxiety and dis-
tress feelings regarding the distress experienced by others. As pointed out by
Baron-Cohen and colleagues [70], however, the Fantasy and Personal Distress
subscales of this measure contain items that may more properly assess imagi-
nation (e.g., “I daydream and fantasize with some regularity about things that
might happen to me”) and emotional self-control (e.g., “in emergency situa-
tions I feel apprehensive and ill at ease”), respectively, than theoretically-derived
notions of empathy. Indeed, the Personal Distress subscale appears to assess
feelings of anxiety, discomfort, and a loss of control in negative environments.
Factor analytic and validity studies suggest that the Personal Distress subscale
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may not assess a central component of empathy [71]. Instead, Personal Distress
may be more related to the personality trait of neuroticism, while the most ro-
bust components of empathy appear to be represented in the Empathic Concern
and Perspective Taking subscales [72]
IRI Davis Scale has been chosen for its relation to the measurement of in-
dividual differences in empathy construct and, secondly, for its relation with
measures of social functioning and the so-called psychological superior functions
[73]. Table 4 summarizes the first questionnaire on multidimensional empathy
measure.
Game questionnaire
The second questionnaire is about a prisoner dilemma game. Each of the 47
participants is asked to answer with a yes or no to 4 questions (see Table 5), each
related to the level of cooperation - cooperation (CC), cooperation - defection
(CD), defection - cooperation (DC), and defection-defection (DD). A virtual
other participant is represented in each interaction leading to 94 decision-makers
in the whole process. The set of choices of each participant is {C,D} where D
is also referred to N for non-cooperation.
Data collection
Regarding the approach to the test, the whole population had a complete com-
prehension and adherence to the tasks. Only 2 questions have been left out by
a participant in the IRI test. In total we have a 99,63% of responsiveness in all
the questions. In the next section, we analyze the results of the second ques-
tionnaire and study the impact of the four IRI scales on the decision making of
the population.
4 Method and Analysis
The analysis is divided into three steps. In the first step, the population is
classified based on the result of the IRI scale. In the second step we analyze
the result of the cooperation. Lastly, the level of cooperation is studied on the
basis of classification of the population in the IRI scale.
IRI scale and population classification
The first step of the analysis concerns the results of women and men population
respectively at the IRI scale. We depict the characteristic of each individual
who participated to the test in table 6. Table 7 represents the number of people
belonging to each sub-scale and those who do not.
The classification of the population based on different empathy subscales is
presented in Table 7. The result shows that 14 people belong to a pure IRI scale
while 25 people has a mixed IRI characteristics and 8 people do not belong to
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Table 4: IRI subscales. Extension of the empathy measure of Davis 1980,
Yarnold et al.1996 and Vitaglione et al. 2003. The star sign (*) denotes an
opposite (reversed) counting/scoring.
Abridged item Women (59.58%) Men(40.42%)
PT EC FS PD PT EC FS PD
(1) Daydream and fantasize (FS)
(2) Concerned with unfortunates (EC) 0.6
(3) Can’t see others’ views∗ (PT)
(4) Not sorry for others ∗ (EC)
(5) Get involved in novels (FS) 0.8
(6) Not-at-ease in emergencies (PD) 0.7
(7) Not caught-up in movies∗ (FS)
(8) Look at all sides in a fight (PT) 0.9124 0.2444
(9) Feel protective of others (EC) 0.3
(10) Feel helpless when emotional (PD)
(11) Imagine friend’s perspective (PT) 0.8393 0.824
(12) Don’t get involved in books∗ (FS)
(13) Remain calm if other’s hurt ∗ (PD)
(14) Others’ problems none mine∗ (EC)
(15) If I’m right I won’t argue∗ (PT)
(16) Feel like movie character (FS)
(17) Tense emotions scare me (PD)
(18) Don’t feel pity for others ∗ (EC)
(19) Effective in emergencies∗ (PD)
(20) Touched by things I see (EC) -0.3452
(21) Two sides to every question (PT)
(22) Soft-hearted person (EC)
(23) Feel like leading character (FS)
(44) Lose control in emergencies (PD)
(25) Put myself in others’ shoes (PT)
(26) Image novels were about me (FS)
(27) Other’s problems destroy me (PD)
(28) Put myself in other’s place (PT) 0.42
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Player I
Cooperate Defect
Player II
Cooperate (A,A) (B,C)
Defect (C,B) (D,D)
Table 5: Payoff matrix for standard prisoner’s dilemma (without empathy con-
sideration). The following inequalities must hold: A > D > B > C [74].
Scale Type Women ID Men ID
PT 1,3, 4,10, 16,19,26,27 12
EC 15 -
FS 11,25 8
PD - 18
PT + EC 7,8,20 -
PT + PD - 4,15
PT + FS 6,12,24 -
EC + FS 17 14
EC + PD 2 -
PT + EC + FS 9,18,21 5,19
PT + EC + PD 23 6,11
PT + FS + PD - 17
EC + FS + PD 5 -
PT + EC + FS + PD 13,14,22 9
None of the scale 28 1,2,3,7,10,13,16
Table 6: IRI scale and participant identification
any IRI scale. In the next section we study the level of cooperation based on
the classification of the population in the IRI scale.
Cooperation study: Prisoner Dilemma
The analysis is based on the IRI test results and on the prisoner’s dilemma test
results. The result of the prisoner’s dilemma suggested that the 35,71 % of
the women population and the 36,84 % of men population have fully confessed.
The results are depicted in Table 8, 9 and 10. Notice that 53,57 % of the
women population and 31,57 % of the men population have partially confessed.
When considering the whole population, 23,40% of them has partially confessed.
Hence, it is necessary to classified them looking at the cooperation level within
the population of those who partially confessed.
A more refined version of cooperation among the women population who
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Scale Type Women Men Total Freq
PT 8 1 9 19,14%
EC 1 - 1 2,12 %
FS 2 1 3 6,38%
PD - 1 1 2,12 %
PT + EC 3 - 3 6,38%
PT + PD - 2 2 4,25%
PT + FS 3 - 3 6,38%
EC + FS 1 1 2 4,25%
EC + PD 1 - 1 2,12 %
PT + EC + FS 3 2 5 10,63%
PT + EC + PD 1 2 3 6,38%
PT + FS + PD - 1 1 2,12 %
EC + FS + PD 1 - 1 2,12 %
PT + EC + FS + PD 3 1 4 8,51%
None of the scale 1 7 8 17,02%
Participants 28 19 47
Table 7: IRI scale and population distribution
partially confessed (15 out of 28) is given in Table 11. We want to compute
the level of cooperation within that population and hence we care about all
the answer of the participants at the questionnaire. Then we derive the level
of cooperation in that population by computing the marginal probability of
confess in the population. More precisely, we consider two random variables
X = {c1, d1} and Y = {c2, d2} for player 1 and player 2 respectively where
ci stands for cooperation of player i and di defection. We then compute the
marginal probability of cooperation of the player 1 given that the player 2 can
confess or defect.
p(c1) =
∑
y∈{c2,d2}
p(X = c1, Y = y).
Cooperation results (Women)
Decision positively partially deny
Result 10 out of 28 15 out of 28 3 out of 28
Frequency 35,71% 53,57% 10,71%
Table 8: Cooperation results: Women
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Cooperation results (Men)
Decision positively partially deny
Result 7 out of 19 6 out of 19 6 out of 19
Frequency 36,84 % 31,57% 31,57%
Table 9: Cooperation results: Men
Cooperation results (Entire population)
Decision positively partially deny
Result 17 out of 47 21 out of 47 9 out of 47
Frequency 36,17 % 44,68% 19,14%
Table 10: Cooperation results: Entire Population
We use the sample statistics to compute the probability of player 1 to cooperate
through the number of occurrences of c1. The result of the marginal probability
of cooperation is equals to 0, 51. Hence in average, 7 people out the 15 can be
classified as positively confessed.
Player I
Cooperate Defect
Player II
Cooperate 10 1
Defect 5 13
Table 11: Women population: Partially confess (decision making). p(c1) = 0.51
In the case of the men, a more refined version of cooperator among those who
partially confess (6 out of 19) is given in Table 12. The marginal probability of
cooperation is equal to p(c1) = 0, 46. Hence in average, 2 people out the 6 can
be classified as positively confessed.
When considering the whole population, the fraction of people who partially
confess is 21/47 and the marginal probability of cooperation is equals to p(c1) =
0, 5. Hence in average, 10 people out of the 21 can be classified as positively
confessed.
Cooperation vs IRI scale
In this subsection, we are interested in computing the level of cooperation in
each IRI ’pure’ subscale. For this aim, we consider the subpopulation belonging
to each scale. We then use the answer of cooperation in the prisoner dilemma
game for computing the probability of cooperation.
PT vs Cooperation
19
Player I
Cooperate Defect
Player II
Cooperate 5 2
Defect 1 5
Table 12: Men: Partially confess (decision making). p(c1) = 0.46.
Player I
Cooperate Defect
Player II
Cooperate 15 3
Defect 6 18
Table 13: Population: Partially confess (decision making). p(c1) = 0.5
Women
Coop\PT A B C D E
p(c) 0 % 0.5 % 0.75% 0.66% 100%
Men
Cooperation\PT A B C D E
p(c) 0 % 0 % 0% 66,66% 0%
Women + Men
Coop\PT A B C D E
p(c) 0 % 0,5 % 75% 66% 100%
The Pearson correlation coefficient between the level of cooperation and the
PT scale is rWomen= 0.7797 (p < .01) for Women, rmen = 1 (p < .01) for
men and rpopulation = 0.6347 (p < .01) for the population belonging to the PT
scale. The interpretation is that there is a positive correlation for Women. The
fact that only one man was PT and had positively cooperate leads to a strong
positive correlation. The overall population of PT positively cooperates.
PD vs Cooperation
Men (18)
Cooperation\PD A B C D E
p(c) 0 % 0 % 0 % 0% 0%
There is only one man who is PD in the IRI scale and the probability of his
level of cooperation was zero since he only denied.
EC vs Cooperation: Women
Women (15)
Cooperation\EC A B C D E
p(c) 0 % 0 % 100 % 0% 0%
There is only one woman EC in the IRI scale and the probability of his
level of cooperation is 1 since she positively confessed. Therefore the Pearson
correlation coefficient is one.
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FS vs Cooperation
Women (11,25)
Coop\FS A B C D E
p(c) 0 % 0 % 0 % 100% 0%
Men (8)
Coop\FS A B C D E
p(c) 0 % 0 % 0% 0% 66,66%
Women + Men
Coop.\FS A B C D E
p(c) 0 % 0 % 0% 100% 66,66%
The Pearson correlation coefficient between the level of cooperation and the
FS scale is rWomen= 1 (p < .01) for Women, rmen = 1 (p < .01) for men and
rpopulation = 0.9891 (p < .01) for the population belonging to the FS scale. The
strong positive correlation between FS and cooperation is due to the fact that
two people had positively confessed and one had partially confessed.
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Cooperation vs IRI mixed scale
In this section we analyze the correlation between the mixed scale of length two
and we also compute the level of cooperation in each sub-population.
• Case PT + EC: the sub-population is composed of only women. The
Pearson correlation coefficient between PT and EC is rWomen = rpopulation
= 0, 8108 (p < .01). The probability of cooperation was p(c) = 0,5.
• Case PT + FS: the sub-population is composed of only women. The
Pearson correlation coefficient between PT and FS is rWomen = rpopulation
= 0, 9382 (p < .01). The probability of cooperation was p(c) = 0,62.
• Case EC + FS: the sub-population is composed of women and men. The
Pearson correlation coefficient between EC and FS is rWomen = = 0, 7845
(p < .01), rMen = = 0, 8709 (p < .01), rpopulation = 0, 7148 (p < .01) for
women, men and the global population respectively. The probability of
cooperation was p(c) = 0,75.
• Case PT + PD: the sub-population is composed of only men. The
Pearson correlation coefficient between PT and PD is rMen = rpopulation
= 0, 2796 (p < .01). The probability of cooperation was p(c) = 0,6.
• Case EC + PD : the sub-population is composed of only women. The
Pearson correlation coefficient between PT and FS is rWomen = rpopulation
= −0, 3462 (p < .01). The probability of cooperation was p(c) = 0,5.
The result of level of cooperation corresponding to the mixed IRI scale of
Table 14 is given in Table 15. We can observe that a high level of cooperation
associated to a high correlation coefficient correspond to the Empathy-Altruism
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Pearson correlation PT EC FS PD
PT - 0,81 0,9382 0,2796
EC - - 0,8709 -0,3462
FS - - - -
PD - - - -
Table 14: subscale correlation
behaviour (namely PT + FS and EC + FS ). A high level of cooperation as-
sociated to a low correlation coefficient corresponds to Empathy-Spitefulness
(namely PT + PD, EC + PD).
Cooperation level
PT + EC 50%
PT + FS 62,5%
PT + PD 66,66 %
EC + FS 75%
EC + PD 50%
Table 15: Level of cooperation at mixed scales
The effect of empathy on decisions
In this section we study the effect of individual scales on the degree of cooper-
ation. For this aim we will compare the result of a pure scale with the group
of individual who do not belong to any IRI sub-scale. The motivation of this
placebo test is that people who do not belongs to any scale can be a valuable
sample for assessing the impact of an IRI scale like PT, EC and FS on user’s
decision making.
Since our dataset is not too large, we rely on the nonparametric linear re-
gression using the Theil’s method [76, 77, 78] for computing the slope median
value, given a dependent variable set {y} and an independent variable {x}.
The dataset of the independent variable {x} is represented by an IRI scale
and it is obtained in the following way: (i) we first select the scale we want
to study ( let say PT scale). The cardinality of the dataset is then given by
the number of people belonging to that scale (see Table 6). Next the value
xi associate to the individual i is computed by choosing the value (let say A)
with the highest choice within the questionnaire {A,B,C,D,E}. Based on the
choice’s result, an integer value is assigned to {xi} following {A = 1, B = 2, C =
3, D = 4, E = 5}.
The dataset of the dependable variable {y} is represented by the result of
the cooperation. An individual i will be assigned a value yi = 1 if he has fully
cooperated, yi = 0.5 if he has partially cooperated and yi = 0 if he has denies.
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Based on the above definition we can now study the effect of the PT scale
on the level of cooperation. There are 9 individual belonging to the pure PT
scale (see Table 16 ).
PT level: pure PT individual
x 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 5
y 0.5 0.5 1 0 0.5 1 1 1 1
Median slope: βPT = 0.2515
Table 16: PT: nonparametric linear regression dataset
The result of the Theil’s slope median is given by βPT = 0.2515, where βPT
is the median slope value of the set
{−1.0010,−0.5010,−0.4980,−0.2500, 0.001, 0.001, 0.001,
0.001, 0.001, 0.002, 0.002, 0.002, 0.003, 0.003,
0.1680, 0.2502, 0.2506, 0.2510,0.2515, 0.4990, 0.4995,
0.4995, 0.5000, 0.5025, 1, 1, 1, 1.004,
167, 250, 250.75, 334, 499, 499,
500.5, 502}
For the placebo test, the dataset for the individual belonging to “None of
the scale” is given by the Table 17
PT level: None of the scale individual
x 1 2 2 2 2 2 4 4
y 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 1
Median slope: βnon of the scale = 0.4995
Table 17: PT level: nonparametric linear regression dataset (none of
the scale)
The result of the Theil’s slope median is given by βnon of the scale =
0.4995, where βnon of the scale is the median slope value of the set
{−0.2495, 0.0005, 0.0005, 0.001, 0.001, 0.002, 0.1673,
0.2501, 0.2503, 0.2505, 0.2506, 0.3336, 0.499,0.4995,
0.4995, 0.4998, 0.996, 1, 1, 166.6667, 249.5,
249.5, 249.75, 250, 332.6667, 498, 499,
499}
Result interpretation: the angular coefficient β measures the effect of the
independent variable x on the dependent variable y. The more is the value of the
angular coefficient, the better is the effect of the independent variable x on the
variable y. The results we get are βPT = 0.2515 and βnon of the scale = 0.4995
and βPT < βnon of the scale. Since we are studying the effect of the PT scale on
the level of cooperation and based on the following result, we cannot concludes
that the only factor which increases the level of cooperation is given by the PT
component.
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Similarly, we are interested in studying the influence of Fantasy scale compo-
nent on the level of cooperation and we follow and apply the approach mentioned
above on the FS component.
The result of the Theil’s slope median is given by βFS = 0.5000, where βFS
is the median slope value (see Table 18 ) of the set {−0.0010,0.5000, 501.0000}
FS level: pure FS individual
x 4 4 5
y 0.5 1 1
Median slope: βFS = 0.5
Table 18: FS: nonparametric linear regression dataset
In the case of individual belonging to “None of the scale”, the result of the
Theil’s slope median is given by βnon of the scale = 0.5000 where, βnon of the scale
is the median slope (see Table 19 ) value of the set
{−0.5005,−0.499, 0.001, 0.0010, 0.001, 0.002, 0.002,
0.2504, 0.2508, 0.4995, 0.4995, 0.5, 0.5003,0.5005,
0.5010, 0.5015, 0.9980, 0.9980, 0.999,
1, 1, 167, 250, 250, 498, 499, 499, 500}
FS level: Non of the scale individual
x 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3
y 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 1 1
Median slope: βnon of the scale = 0.5005
Table 19: FS level: nonparametric linear regression dataset (none of
the scale)
The dataset of the component EC and PD is to small to perform the non-
parametric linear regression on it.
Explanation
Game without empathy
We consider the one-shot game given by Table 20. Pareto efficiency, or Pareto
optimality, is an action profile in which it is not possible to make any one player
better off without making at least one player worse off. A Nash equilibrium is
a situation in which no player can improve her payoff by unilateral deviation.
The action profile (D,D) is the unique Nash equilibrium, and D is a dominant
strategy choice for each player. But (C,C) Pareto-dominates (D,D). The three
choice pairs (C,C), (C,D), and (D,C) are all Pareto optimal, but (C,C) is the
most socially efficient choice pair.
The classical game model fails to explain the experimental observation:
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Player I
Cooperate Defect
Player II
Cooperate (-6,-6) (−120, 0)
Defect (0,−120) (-72,-72)
Table 20: Payoff matrix of prisoner’s dilemma questionnaire
In the classical prisoner dilemma (without empathy consideration), the strat-
egy which consists to defect is a dominated strategy. Hence it is expected that
- in the rational case - all the people decides to defect in the questionnaire of
the first experiment (see Table 20). But this was not the case since 19,14% of
the population defected (see Table 10). This result can be due to some psycho-
logical aspect of the human behavior when taking part of the game. The idea
is to modify the classical payoff and integrate the empathy in the preferences of
the players. This leads to an empathetic payoff as explained below.
Game with empathy consideration
As observed from the data, a significant level of cooperation appears in the
experimental game. This suggests a new modelling and design of the classical
game and better understanding the behavior of the participants. We propose
a a new payoff matrix that takes into consideration the effect of empathy in
the outcome. Denote by λ12 the degree of empathy of the prisoner 1 has over
the prisoner 2 and by λ21 the vice versa. The payoff of the classical prisoner
dilemma game (see Table 20) changes and now depends on the level of empathy
λ12 and λ21 of the prisoners (see Table 21). Now we are interested in finding all
the possible equilibria of the new game based on the value of λ12 and λ21.
P I
C D
P II
C (−6− 6λ12,−6− 6λ21) (−120,−120λ21)
D (−120λ12,−120) (−72− 72λ12,−72− 72λ21)
Table 21: Payoff matrix of the prisoner dilemma with empathy consideration.
Equilibrium analysis of Table 21
• CC is an equilibrium if λ12 ≥
6
114 ; λ21 ≥
6
114
• CN is an equilibrium if λ12 ≥
2
3 ; λ21 ≤
6
114
• NC is an equilibrium if λ12 ≤
6
114 ; λ21 ≥
2
3
• NN is an equilibrium if λ12 ≤
2
3 ; λ21 ≤
2
3
Since empathy can be positive, negative or null, we analyze the outcome of the
game with different signs of the parameters λ12 and λ21.
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Analysis 1: λ12, λ21 ≥ 0 we now consider λ12 and λ21 as two random variables
with a distribution across the population. We generalized the outcome of the
game based on their values.
• case 1: (medium-medium): if λ12, λ21 ∈
[
6
114 ,
2
3
]
then we have 3 equi-
libria: CC, NN, and the mixed equilibria p2C+(1−p2)N or p1C+(1−p1)N
with p1 =
8−12λ12
7(1+λ12)
and p2 =
8−12λ21
7(1+λ21)
.
• case 2 (high - high): if λ12, λ21 ∈
[
2
3 , 1
]
then CC is the unique equilib-
rium.
• case 3a (high - low): if λ12 ∈
[
2
3 , 1
]
and λ21 ∈
[
0, 6114
]
then CN is the
unique equilibrium.
• case 3b (low - high): if λ12 ∈
[
0, 6114
]
and λ21 ∈
[
2
3 , 1
]
then NC is the
unique equilibrium.
• case 4a (medium - low): if λ12 ∈
[
6
114 ,
2
3
]
and λ21 ∈
[
0, 6114
]
then NN
is the unique equilibrium.
• case 4b ( low - medium ): if λ12 ∈
[
0, 6114
]
and λ21 ∈
[
6
114 ,
2
3
]
then NN
is the unique equilibrium.
• case 5a ( λ12 high ): if λ12 >
2
3 then C is a dominating strategy (un-
conditional cooperation) for player 1.
• case 5b ( λ21 high ): if λ21 >
2
3 then C is a dominating strategy (uncon-
ditional cooperation). for player 2.
• case 6a ( λ12 low ): if λ12 ∈
[
0, 6114
]
then N is a dominating strategy
(unconditional non-cooperation) for player 1.
• case 6b ( λ21 low ): if λ21 ∈
[
0, 6114
]
then N is a dominating strategy
(unconditional non-cooperation) for player 2.
Analysis 2: λ12, λ21 < 0
• if λ12, λ21 < 0 then NN is the unique equilibrium.
Analysis 3: λ12 > 0, λ21 < 0
• if λ21 < 0 then N is the dominating strategy (unconditional non-cooperation)
for player 2.
• if λ12 >
2
3 then CN is an equilibrium.
• if λ12 <
2
3 then NN is an equilibrium.
Analysis 4: λ12 < 0, λ21 > 0
• if λ12 < 0 then N is a dominating strategy (unconditional non-cooperation)
for player 1.
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• if λ21 >
2
3 and λ12 ∈
[
− 6114 , 0
]
then NC is an equilibrium.
• if λ21 <
2
3 then NN is an equilibrium.
Figure 2 summarizes the outcome of the two-player game.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium of the game with Empathy consideration
The proposed empathetic payoff better captures the preferences of the play-
ers as a negligible proportion of cooperators are obtained analytically in the
new game. Thus, if one quantity accurately the empathy’s effect in the payoff,
then the resulting game is more adapted to the results of experiment. By doing
this iteratively over several experiments and model adjustment we obtain bet-
ter game theoretic models for real life interaction. We believe that the generic
approach developed here can be extended to other class of games as indicated
in [45, 75].
5 Conclusion
We have proposed a basic experiment on the role of empathy in one-shot Pris-
oner Dilemma. We analyzed multidimensional components of empathy using
IRI scale. The experiment on the field conducted at NYUAD, Learning and
Game Theory Lab, was composed of population of 47 persons (28 women and
19 men). The experimental game provided interesting data. A non-negligible
proportion of the participants (35,71% of women and 36,84% of the men popula-
tion) have fully confessed. Considering the whole population, 36,17% have fully
confessed and the 19,14% have fully denied. In terms of partial confession be-
haviors, 0.46% of the women population and 0,54% of the men population have
partially confessed. Considering the whole population, 0,45% have partially
confessed in this reproduction of Prisoner Dilemma game. Regarding the distri-
bution of women and men population at the Interpersonal Reactivity Index, the
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Figure 3: Empathy scale distribution across the population of participants
experimental results reveal that the dominated strategies of the classical game
theory are not dominated any more when users’s psychology is involved, and a
significant level of cooperation is observed among the users who are positively
partially empathetic.
The next future lines of our work would be based on a possible creation
and implementation of a new model of empathy measurement that may take
into account a multi-faceted presence of different variables (general attitude to
risk, a general estimation of the different heuristics present in the person, how
is internalized individually the model Imagine Self/Imagine other that leads to
reciprocity, individual attitude to fairness). Our aim is to make of this model
a possible and valid model of measurement related to every day life situations
where empathy is playing a key role not only in engineering field but, also, in
social, economic and institutional area.
Everyday life seems to be really different and far from laboratory situations,
where all the concepts are built around a crystalized idea of what it is or it should
be. The evolutionary lines are then taken into account in our research as an
important way to get data from a longitudinal perspective. The dissatisfaction
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for a simple instrument of testing empathy leads us to rethink, first of all,
our next step in empathy measurement. It would take into account two lines,
essentially:
1. a combined series of instrument of measurement, that will consider a mul-
tidimensional level of empathy.
2. a possibility to test and retest the variable in different moments and ways
(construct validity, test and retest the person about the same cluster, e.
g affective empathy).
3. A feedback from verbal and not verbal communication analysis software.
It would be interesting to investigate (i) if there is any relationship between
age and strategic decision making, (ii) How the altruism and spitefulness evolve
with increasing age. Furthermore, gender difference (if any) should be investi-
gated in a bigger population and in games with distribution-dependent payoffs
[39, 40, 53, 54].
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6 Statistical Data
Below we provide statistical data from the experimental game conducted in the
Laboratory.
Tables 22 23 24 25 report the data for women in the four IRI scales (PT,EC,FS,PD).
Tables 26, 27, 28,29 focus on men statistical data for the four IRI scales
(PT,EC,FS,PD).
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Women positively confess
PT A B C D E
Woman 3 0 3 0 4 0
Woman 5 0 3 3 1 0
Woman 6 0 1 2 3 1
Woman 11 0 2 4 1 0
Woman 15 0 5 2 0 0
Woman 16 1 2 1 3 0
Woman 17 0 3 3 0 1
Woman 19 1 1 0 1 4
Woman 24 2 1 2 2 0
Woman 27 0 2 3 1 0
Who is PT 3,6, 16, 19,24, 27
Not PT 5,11,15,17
Unclear
Women partially confess
PT A B C D E
Woman 2 1 3 3 0 0
Woman 4 1 1 2 2 1
Woman 7 2 0 0 0 5
Woman 8 2 0 2 3 0
Woman 9 0 2 3 2 0
Woman 10 0 3 2 2 0
Woman 12 0 1 5 1 0
Woman 14 0 1 4 2 0
Woman 18 0 2 0 1 4
Woman 20 1 1 1 1 3
Woman 21 1 1 1 4 0
Woman 22 0 0 7 0 0
Woman 23 0 2 3 1 1
Woman 25 1 3 1 0 2
Woman 26 0 1 3 1 1
Who is PT 4,7,8,9,10,12,14,18,20,21,22,23,26
Not PT 2, 25
Unclear
Woman Deny
PT A B C D E
Woman 1 0 1 2 4 0
Woman 13 0 1 2 2 2
Woman 28 3 1 1 2 0
Who is PT 1,13
Not PT 28
Unclear
Table 22: PT: Woman Result (positively, partially and deny tables)
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Woman positively confess
EC A B C D E
Woman 3 2 3 1 1 0
Woman 5 2 1 0 4 0
Woman 6 0 4 1 1 1
Woman 11 0 4 1 1 1
Woman 15 3 0 2 2 0
Woman 16 3 1 2 1 0
Woman 17 2 1 1 3 0
Woman 19 3 1 1 1 1
Woman 24 0 4 1 1 1
Woman 27 2 2 2 1 0
Who is EC 5,15,17
Not EC 3,6,11,16,19,24,27
Unclear
Woman partially confess
EC A B C D E
Woman 2 1 2 0 3 1
Woman 4 1 2 4 0 0
Woman 7 1 2 0 1 3
Woman 8 3 0 1 3 0
Woman 9 1 2 0 4 0
Woman 10 3 1 1 2 0
Woman 12 0 4 2 1 0
Woman 14 0 0 4 3 0
Woman 18 1 0 2 1 3
Woman 20 3 0 0 1 3
Woman 21 2 1 0 3 1
Woman 22 1 2 0 4 0
Woman 23 0 2 2 3 0
Woman 25 4 0 1 1 1
Woman 26 2 1 2 0 2
Who is EC 2,9,18,14,7,20,21,8,22,23
Not EC 4,10,12,25,26
Unclear
Woman Deny
EC A B C D E
Woman 1 1 1 4 1 0
Woman 13 0 2 2 3 0
Woman 28 2 1 2 0 2
Who is EC 13
Not EC 1,28
Unclear
Table 23: EC: Woman Result (positively, partially and deny tables)
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Woman positively confess
FS A B C D E
Woman 3 4 1 2 0 0
Woman 5 3 0 3 1 0
Woman 6 0 2 4 1 0
Woman 11 0 2 1 4 0
Woman 15 3 2 2 0 0
Woman 16 1 5 0 1 0
Woman 17 2 1 2 2 0
Woman 19 2 3 0 1 1
Woman 24 0 1 5 1 0
Woman 27 2 0 3 2 0
Who is FS 11,5,6,17,24,3
Not FS 3,15,16,19
Unclear
Woman partially confess
FS A B C D E
Woman 2 2 1 1 1 2
Woman 4 1 4 1 0 1
Woman 7 0 3 1 3 0
Woman 8 1 1 3 1 1
Woman 9 2 0 0 5 0
Woman 10 1 6 0 0 0
Woman 12 0 1 4 2 0
Woman 14 0 0 2 4 1
Woman 18 1 1 2 2 1
Woman 20 2 1 1 1 2
Woman 21 1 1 3 2 0
Woman 22 1 1 2 3 0
Woman 23 0 0 1 1 5
Woman 25 1 1 2 2 1
Woman 26 0 4 3 0 0
Who is FS 9,12,14,18,21,22,23,25
Not FS 4,10,26
Unclear
Woman Deny
FS A B C D E
Woman 1 2 3 1 1 0
Woman 13 0 0 0 3 4
Woman 28 4 0 0 2 1
Who is FS 1,28
Not FS 13
Unclear
Table 24: FS: Women’s Result (positively, partially and deny tables)
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Woman positively confess
PD A B C D E
Woman 3 1 2 2 2 0
Woman 5 3 0 0 4 0
Woman 6 2 3 0 4 0
Woman 11 0 4 3 0 0
Woman 15 0 4 2 1 0
Woman 16 1 2 3 1 0
Woman 17 3 3 1 0 0
Woman 19 4 1 0 1 1
Woman 24 1 2 3 1 0
Woman 27 2 3 2 0 0
Who is PD 3,6,11,15,16,17,4,27,24
Not PD 5
Unclear
Woman partially confess
PD A B C D E
Woman 2 3 0 1 1 2
Woman 4 1 1 4 0 1
Woman 7 1 2 1 2 1
Woman 8 3 1 2 1 0
Woman 9 0 4 3 0 0
Woman 10 4 2 1 0 0
Woman 12 0 4 2 1 0
Woman 14 0 1 5 1 0
Woman 18 2 2 1 2 0
Woman 20 1 2 3 0 1
Woman 21 1 5 0 1 0
Woman 22 0 3 2 1 1
Woman 23 0 0 5 2 0
Woman 25 2 4 0 0 1
Woman 26 2 3 1 0 1
Who is PD 23, 2, 14, 22
Not PD 4, 8, 9, 10, 12, 18, 20, 21, 25, 26
Unclear
Woman Deny
PD A B C D E
Woman 1 2 1 1 1 1
Woman 13 0 0 3 4 0
Woman 28 3 1 0 1 2
Who is PD 1,28
Not PD 13
Unclear
Table 25: PD: Women Result (positively, partially and deny tables)
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Men positively confess
PT A B C D E
Man 1 0 3 2 1 1
Man 4 0 2 1 1 3
Man 8 0 2 4 1 0
Man 10 0 1 2 4 1
Man 11 3 0 1 1 2
Man 12 1 1 2 3 0
Man 19 0 1 1 4 1
Who is PT 4,10,12,11,19
Not PT 1,8
Unclear
Men partially confess
PT A B C D E
Man 3 0 3 1 3 0
Man 5 0 3 3 0 0
Man 6 1 0 1 4 1
Man 7 3 3 0 0 1
Man 13 2 5 0 0 0
Man 14 4 0 1 0 2
Who is PT 7,13,14
Not PT 5,6
Unclear
Men Deny
PT A B C D E
Man 2 0 3 2 0 2
Man 9 0 1 3 3 0
Man 15 0 2 1 4 0
Man 16 0 4 3 0 0
Man 17 0 3 3 1 0
Man 18 0 4 3 0 0
Who is PT 9,15,17
Not PT 2,16,18
Unclear
Table 26: PT: Men’s Result (positively, partially and deny tables)
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Men positively confess
EC A B C D E
Man 1 3 3 0 1 0
Man 4 3 0 2 1 1
Man 8 0 4 3 0 0
Man 10 0 2 4 0 1
Man 11 1 0 1 4 1
Man 12 3 1 1 2 0
Man 19 1 0 1 4 1
Who is EC 10,11,19
Not EC 1,8,12,4
Unclear
Men partially confess
EC A B C D E
Man 3 0 5 2 0 0
Man 5 1 1 3 0 2
Man 6 1 1 0 4 1
Man 7 1 2 4 0 0
Man 13 0 5 2 0 0
Man 14 0 1 4 2 0
Who is EC 5,6,14
Not EC 3,7,13
Unclear
Men Deny
Man EC A B C D E
Man 2 2 2 0 2 1
Man 9 0 3 1 3 0
Man 15 1 3 3 0 0
Man 16 3 1 3 0 0
Man 17 0 3 4 0 0
Man 18 3 2 1 1 0
Who is EC 9
Not EC 2,15,16,17,18
Unclear
Table 27: EC: Men’s Result group 3
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Men positively confess
FS A B C D E
Man 1 1 3 1 0 2
Man 4 1 2 1 0 1
Man 8 1 1 1 1 3
Man 10 0 2 3 2 0
Man 11 3 1 0 0 3
Man 12 0 2 4 1 0
Man 19 0 2 0 4 1
Who is FS 8,10,19
Not FS 1, 4,11,12
Unclear
Men partially confess
FS A Man B C D E
Man 3 2 5 0 0 0
Man 5 0 0 4 1 2
Man 6 4 3 0 0 0
Man 7 4 3 0 0 0
Man 13 5 1 1 0 0
Man 14 0 1 6 0 0
Who is FS 3,6,7,13
Not FS 5,14
Unclear
Men Deny
FS A B C D E
Man 2 3 1 0 3 0
Man 9 0 2 4 1 0
Man 15 0 3 2 1 1
Man 16 1 3 2 1 0
Man 17 1 1 4 1 0
Man 18 0 4 3 0 0
Who is FS 9, 17
Not FS 2,15,16,18
Unclear
Table 28: FS: Men’s Result (positively, partially and deny tables)
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Men positively confess
PD A B C D E
Man 1 2 2 0 3 0
Man 4 2 0 2 0 3
Man 8 0 3 2 2 0
Man 10 0 3 3 1 0
Man 11 1 1 1 0 4
Man 12 3 2 2 0 0
Man 19 2 1 2 1 1
Who is PD 4,10,11
Not PD 1,8,10,12,19
Unclear
Men partially confess
PD A B C D E
Man 3 0 5 2 0 0
Man 5 0 4 1 2 0
Man 6 1 0 4 2 0
Man 7 4 1 0 0 2
Woman 13 1 3 3 0 0
Woman 14 0 4 1 1 1
Who is PD 6
Not PD 3,5,7,13,14
Unclear
Men Deny
PD A B C D E
Man 2 4 1 0 1 1
Man 9 1 2 3 1 0
Man 15 1 2 0 4 0
Man 16 0 7 0 0 0
Man 17 2 0 1 4 0
Man 18 0 2 4 1 0
Who is PD 9,15,17,18
Not PD 2,16
Unclear
Table 29: PD: Men’s Result (positively, partially and deny tables)
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